

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MAKING PEACEKEEPERS:
THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES POLICY ON STABILITY OPERATIONS**

by

Colonel Daniel B. Leatherman
United States Army

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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United States policy on stability operations has undergone important changes over the last decade and continues to evolve today. This project reviews President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25, and the national security documents released under President George W. Bush, including the newly released National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD/44) and DoD Directive 3000.05. The project then examines the DoD directive in detail and makes recommendations on how to improve U.S. policy on stability operations and how to implement the DoD Directive.

MAKING PEACEKEEPERS: THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES POLICY ON STABILITY OPERATIONS

A violent insurgency in a far-away land, a struggling economy, unhappy soldiers, mounting crises in other parts of the world and flagging support at home. This seemingly familiar situation confronted Roman Emperor Hadrian in 122 AD. These same problems have also faced many others, including King George III in 1781, President De Gaulle in 1961, and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988. While all of these situations had different starting points and eventual solutions, they serve to illustrate that the United States is not the only country to have struggled with stability operations. The root cause of this problem seems to be that the U.S. lacks a coherent political or military policy regarding these operations. Ask people the question, "What is the policy of the United States on peacekeeping?" and you will almost surely not get the same answer twice. Some will probably be surprised that we even have one, and no one can blame them. U.S. policy in this area has been a disjointed mixture of Presidential directives, congressional pressure, military preferences, international expectations and public opinion, none of which presents a coherent statement on when, how, why, or with whom the U.S. will conduct stability operations. This lack of coherence is the result of a mixed history and lack of attention to this critical aspect of U.S. national policy. However, developments over the last twelve years seem to have led the U.S., however haltingly, to a new agreement on how they will perform this vital task.

Of course, policy starts at the top. Until just recently, the last presidential policy statement was in 1994 by President Clinton when he signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, intended "to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period."¹ While this was produced over a decade ago, before Bosnia, before Kosovo, before Rwanda, and well before the events of September 11, 2001, it was the only statement of Presidential intent we had to guide our understanding of U.S. policy on stability operations. Under the George W. Bush administration other documents have been produced which may provide a better understanding of current U.S. policy: The National Security Strategy, The National Defense Strategy, and The National Military Strategy. Recently, two new documents were released which directly focus on a new approach to conducting stability operations. DoD Directive 3000.05 is an internal DoD policy statement regarding stability operations, and the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, issued by President George W. Bush, which assigned the Department of State the responsibility for leading U.S. stability efforts. We will review each of these documents to develop a basic understanding of declared U.S. policy,

analyze what they contribute or omit, with special emphasis on the DoD Directive, and make recommendations on how to improve U.S. national policy on stability operations.

Before we begin, it is necessary to answer a fundamental question: What are “Stability Operations” and how do they relate to “Peacekeeping” and “Peace Operations”? Over the past several years, many terms have been used to describe actions which use military forces but do not quite fit the definition of major combat; recently however, there has been a general consensus on the use of these terms. While their definitions come from an Army Field Manual, the terms “Stability Operations” and “Support Operations” have become the terms commonly used by both the joint and inter-agency community to refer to military actions short of major combat.² In current usage, Stability Operations includes all forms of Peace Operations and Peacekeeping and can also include actions as diverse as security assistance, non-combatant evacuation and combating terrorism. Support Operations are those actions taken to provide assistance to either foreign or domestic civil authorities, normally in response to a crisis or to deliver humanitarian aid. This understanding of the two terms is essential as we examine U.S. policy in this arena.

Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)

President Clinton issued PDD 25 in 1994, but it was kept secret until early 1996 when an unclassified version was released. This document described the administration’s policy regarding peace operations and addressed several other important issues. Most important among these issues was which operations would receive U.S. support or participation, and how the United Nations should reform how they conducted business.

While both of these areas are important aspects of U.S. policy, our focus is on the very first issue addressed, making choices about which peace operations would receive U.S. backing. This section of the policy addresses various standards that the administration will use to determine when the U.S. will support a proposed operation in the U.N.³ In addition to these standards the policy strongly stresses that these operations must not be open-ended commitments with undefined schedules or budgets, and states that any operation that cannot be defined in these terms must not be undertaken. This section also specifies that the U.S. will use this same set of standards to evaluate ongoing missions as they come up for renewal of their U.N. mandate. PDD 25 goes on to spell out additional, and even more stringent, standards that will be used to evaluate any proposed peace operation in which U.S. troops will participate.⁴

Of course, as with any set of evaluation criteria, it is very important how you define such terms as “unacceptable” or “significant”. In this case an argument has been made that the

administration could use this policy “to justify any decision with the terms of the Directive, on a case-by-case basis.”⁶ Unfortunately, a revised version of PDD 25 has not been produced by President George W. Bush and we are left to wonder if this policy is still being used to guide U.S. decision-making on the issue of stability operations.

National Security Strategy

Unlike PDD 25, The National Security Strategy (NSS) is published on a regular basis and describes how the President intends to use all aspects of national power to accomplish national goals. President George W. Bush’s NSS, published in September 2002, presents a strong case for championing human rights, improving global economic opportunity, dealing with the War on Terrorism, and promoting freedom and democracy throughout the world, but it is sadly silent on the issue of peace operations as an element of his strategy. It makes no effort to replace, or even refine, PDD 25 and makes no mention at all of using peace operations as a method of supporting overall U.S. goals.

National Defense Strategy:

The inaugural National Defense Strategy was published by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in March of 2005. This is the first time a Secretary of Defense has published his own strategy document separate from The National Military Strategy. In the past, The National Military Strategy, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a direct descendant of the NSS.

Secretary Rumsfeld mentions stability operations several times within the NDS (although he uses the term “peace operations”). In a section dealing with “guidelines for ... strategic planning and decision making”, stability operations are mentioned as one component of an “active, layered defense” which includes preventive actions intended to prevent conflicts from reaching the United States.⁶ Stability operations are discussed again under the heading of “Increasing Capabilities Of Partners-International And Domestic.”⁷ In this section the Secretary describes where organizations outside the DoD are perhaps best suited to conduct various aspects of peace operations. He specifically mentions the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in terms of helping partners improve their abilities to deal with their own regional peace operation requirements. The GPOI is a multi-lateral program developed by the George W. Bush administration to train troops from several countries, many of them African, in peace operations.⁸ This initiative was widely hailed as a positive step forward in supporting peace operations.

The Secretary also discusses support for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (created within the State Department in August 2004). He describes this department's role as performing "non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default."⁹ The wording is revealing. While he acknowledges the critical role of the military in stability operations, the Secretary clearly feels that DoD should not take the lead in post-conflict stability activities, and indicates that by supporting the efforts of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization he can avoid becoming enmeshed in a mission he feels is best performed by others. Secretary Rumsfeld's most lengthy discussion of stability operations is in the section covering the "shape and size of military forces"¹⁰ Here he discusses the need to adequately plan for lengthy stability operations following the end of successful combat operations, and be prepared to perform peace operations, which he includes under the category of "lesser contingencies."¹¹

What can we take away from the National Defense Strategy in terms of stability operations policy? Secretary Rumsfeld clearly understands the need to conduct stability operations, but just as clearly, wishes to do so as little as possible and with another agency or partner taking the lead to perform the lion's share of the work. What we do not get from the document is any understanding of when, where, how, or why the U.S. should undertake these types of missions, or what actions he intends to take to ensure U.S. military forces are prepared to perform these missions.

National Military Strategy (NMS)

The NMS is authored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is his statement of how the military will work to support and implement the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. While the military does not create national policy, the methods they use to implement national policy can reveal a great deal.

General Richard B. Myers makes two specific references to peace operations/stability operations that provide some detail of how the military will execute these missions, but not before he reinforces the Secretary's position that this work is best done by others. He does this under the heading of "Creating a Global Anti-Terrorism Environment" where he refers to increasing the capabilities of partners and working with other governmental agencies to "establish favorable security conditions."¹² Deeper in the document he discusses performing stability operations at the end of successful combat operations, and specifies that these functions may need to be conducted concurrently. Gen Myers also emphasizes in two different areas the need to develop and train on Joint Operating Concepts "(JOC's)"¹³ for stability

operations and how they must be both complementary to, and integrated with JOC's for combat operations.

These last two references to stability operations reveal that Gen Myers sees stability operations not in terms of engagement used to prevent or reduce the scope of potential conflict, but rather as the follow-on operation to successful combat operations. While this demonstrates that the lesson of recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has been learned, it also makes no effort to apply that learning in new ways. Significantly, it does address, at a high level, the need to integrate stability operations with combat operations and to create mutually supporting JOC's. This indicates that the military has received the message from the civilian authorities that stability operations are an important part of U.S. military strategy.

DOD Directive 3000.05

On 28 November 2005, the Department of Defense issued DoD Directive Number 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations¹⁴, which codifies DoD's commitment to establish and maintain stability operation capability throughout the U.S. defense structure. This, as they say, is huge. The U.S. military has historically tried to avoid stability operations, based partly on the argument that it degrades readiness for combat operations. This position has also had support on Capitol Hill. Based on the historic view of this type of work as "not our job", it is significant that DoD has apparently now embraced this mission.

The genesis of this policy came from a study undertaken by the Defense Science Board (DSB) in 2004 at the request of Secretary Rumsfeld.¹⁵ In their report, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities¹⁶, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, they laid out numerous recommendations intended to address the challenge of future stabilization and reconstruction operations. This report was referenced and re-emphasized less than a year later when the DSB submitted the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD.¹⁷ The latter report focused on "the institutional hurdles to effectively constitute and use capabilities for stability operations as called for in the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, and the subsequent draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the report."¹⁸

The draft Directive referred to in this statement is DOD Directive 3000.05, and the report strongly, and repeatedly, recommends implementation of this directive. It also states that the policy recommended in the previous study required no dramatic changes despite the passage of

time and further experience in Iraq. Essentially, this report tells the Under Secretary to hurry up and do what we told you to do a year ago, and apparently the argument worked. Two months after submission of Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, DOD Directive 3000.05 was signed by Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England.

DoD Directive 3000.05 requires that several significant actions take place to develop U.S. ability to effectively conduct stability operations and interact with other agencies engaged in the same mission. We will examine the most significant of those actions and help explain what they really mean and why they are important.

The directive begins with this strong declaration regarding the intent of the policy:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.¹⁹

Placing stability operations on the same footing as combat operations indicates how serious DoD is about developing this capability, since combat is the *sine qua non* of the armed forces. This statement possibly represents the most significant shift in the mission of the U.S. military in many years.

The next section of the Directive discusses the reasons the U.S. may conduct stability operations and sets forth a concise and appropriate statement of intent, "Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values."²⁰ Crucial to this statement is what it does *not* say. It does not restrict these operations only to post-combat operations as have some other policy statements, such as the National Military Strategy. That document discussed stability operations solely in terms of post-conflict actions. The wording of this statement indicates a wider application and therefore an appreciation of stability operations as a tool which can be used in a greater variety of ways to support U.S. interests.

The next important statement in the directive serves to continue the theme which began with the National Defense Strategy authored by Secretary Rumsfeld, that "Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals."²¹ Initially this can lead us to believe that the policy has, in fact, not really changed and that DoD still wants to perform this task as little as possible. However, the very next sentence signals a shift in the thinking of the top officials at DoD, "Nonetheless, U.S. military forces *shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary* (emphasis added) to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." This reinforces the idea that the military must be able to perform this task until

other agencies are ready to assume responsibility, even while recognizing that other agencies and organizations are more adept at stability tasks given the proper environment. This statement must also be considered in the light of the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, issued on 7 December 2005 which directs “that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”²² Directive 3000.05 was clearly developed in coordination with the Presidential Directive and concedes the lead role in stability operations to the Department of State, while acknowledging DoD's critical supporting role within the policy.

Policy

This section of the Directive describes several actions to be performed as part of the implementation of this policy. Some of these are general statements of intent, while some are more detailed tasks to be performed by elements of DoD. We will examine some of the more important actions that DoD sees as critical to the success of the policy:

1. “The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams.”²³ This demonstrates that the lessons from other conflicts are once more being put to good use. Experience from other support operations shows that teams composed of military, other governmental agencies, International Organizations, Non-governmental Organizations, and members of the private sector are much more effective at addressing the needs of local populations than any one group acting independently. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's) being used in Afghanistan are the most recent example of this concept. Comprised of both military and civilian elements, they have been effective at helping the Afghans reestablish infrastructure and effective local governance. A modified version of this program is also being introduced in Iraq.

2. “Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan.”²⁴ This can almost be viewed as a self-criticism by the DOD directed at what Fred Kaplan describes as the “botched”²⁵ planning for the war in Iraq. Regardless of the motivation behind the action, this is a necessary step to ensure that stability operations are integrated into military contingency plans. The crucial element here is that they are an *integrated* part of the plan and not simply a boilerplate annex which is attached to all operations plans. That type of ineffective thinking has been applied in the past to other aspects of operations which have been considered subordinate to combat operations, such as logistics and chemical weapons defense. This has always led to degraded operations or a frantic attempt to

play “catch-up” when reality finally strikes home. Stability operations must be integrated into all phases of a plan so that it provides an embedded capability that can be employed simultaneous with combat operations.

3. “DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements.”²⁶ Intelligence is a critical component of any military or security operation. This is especially true during stability operations where intelligence drives operations, instead of the other way around. This is because stability operations are not focused on the large scale destruction of enemy forces, but on maintaining security, identifying potential threats to the peace, and supporting the law enforcement aspect of the operation. While this is a different concept from combat operations, the skills needed to perform intelligence operations within a stability operation are much the same as during combat operations and can be quickly adapted as needed. The difference is that intelligence operators must be trained and prepared to shift their focus from enemy military formations to organized crime, insurgent operations, or former leaders who may be wanted for war crimes. They must also be prepared to assume the lead staff role in advising the commander where to focus his efforts.

4. “Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.”²⁷ This is one of the most fundamental changes found in the directive, and one which is critical to the success of the concept. Capabilities begin with training and this paragraph requires all training courses within the military to incorporate the skills necessary to perform successful stability operations. This is in stark contrast with past practice of “just-in-time” training for these operations. We have repeatedly sent forces to conduct stability operations with little or no training for the unique tasks they will need to perform and with little understanding of the region they are about to enter. This is most dramatically displayed in terms of interaction with the indigenous population. Most of the U.S. military (like U.S. society in general) are not bilingual, have not spent any time studying foreign cultures, and have no training in the fundamentals of governance (such as how to make sure the garbage is collected). An excellent example of this is negotiations with political or religious leaders. Once on the ground, leaders from squad level to Commanding General must negotiate agreements with their indigenous counterparts regarding everything from what changes must be made in governing structure to what time the local bar must close. Yet, they are still at a distinct disadvantage because, while they are operating from a position of strength, they are dealing with people who know the local environment, people and customs,

and know how to manipulate a situation to their own advantage. This section of the directive aims directly at building embedded capability within U.S. forces which will give them a head-start in successful execution of stability operations even without any last minute surge in training.

Responsibilities

The next section of the Directive specifies the responsibilities of various officials in implementing the policy, and there is a significant amount of crucial information found here. Broad statements of intent are of little effect without the implementing instructions, authorizations and assignment of responsibility necessary to execute the task, and this section is where those are found. While this section of the Directive is quite explicit in terms of responsibilities, there is, however, one significant element lacking in this section, and that is the assignment of an Executive Agent for overall implementation of the policy. In the document Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD,²⁸ released by the Defense Science Board Task Force in September 2005, the DSB recommend the Secretary of the Army be designated the Executive Agent for implementation of the policy. However, there is no such designation within this document, which leads to a concern common among military leaders, every operation needs a leader and without one, who will ensure implementation and success, or more succinctly, who is in charge?

There are almost eight pages of specific responsibilities identified in this section of the Directive, and while some of them are broad guidance and standard bureaucrat-ese, there is important information to be found here. In some ways this section indicates a more dramatic shift in policy than the actual policy section of the Directive so we will examine some of the more significant responsibilities assigned within this section.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

“Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.”²⁹ This is a reinforcement of the policy which was also outlined in the National Defense Strategy and has been discussed earlier. DoD continues to support the mission of the S/CRS as a way to develop capacity in other organizations to conduct stability operations. While it can be viewed that this is an effort to rid itself of this mission by supporting State Department stability operations capability, the very existence of this Directive indicates that is not the case. Also, as discussed earlier, this Directive was almost certainly coordinated with the Presidential Directive giving the Department of State primacy for stability operations.

“Ensure stability operations are incorporated into the strategic policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans the Secretary of Defense provides to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”³⁰ This indicates that the CJCS and the Combatant Commanders will now be given instructions to prepare for stability operations in addition to the myriad of other missions they must be prepared to conduct. This is significant in that these commanders are the ones responsible for execution of military operations and without direction from the Secretary to prepare for such missions, they will ignore them in favor of the things they have been directed to do.

“Create a stability operations center to coordinate stability operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned”.³¹ This aspect of the policy provides a method of institutionalizing the lessons from stability operations and disseminating those lessons to the force as doctrine and Joint Operating Concepts. Where this center is located will be another indicator of how DoD intends to implement this policy. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute located at Carlisle Barracks currently fills this role for the Army and could conceivably expand to perform this function for all of DoD. This would be the obvious organization to meet this requirement, but needs to be closely tied to Joint Forces Command who has responsibility to “Explore new stability operations concepts and capabilities...”³²

Probably the most significant aspect of this policy is the reference to recruiting, developing, and retaining those people with skill sets which contribute to successful stability operations. The primary responsibility for this is tasked to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. However, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command are also tasked to provide programs to develop and retain the “quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations.”³³ This is a crucial aspect of this policy, and one which absolutely must be performed well if the policy is to be successful. There are two reasons for this. First, the defense community must develop the skills necessary to be proficient in this mission. This includes not only the specific unit tasks conducted on the ground, but also the ability to plan and operate effectively with other U.S. agencies, Non-governmental Organizations, International Organizations, allies and others who have expertise in this function. Second, unless the people in the services, both uniformed and civilian, see this as a valued skill and an accepted pathway to promotion, no one will want to focus on these skills or assignments since it will be seen as a “dead end street.” The most dramatic and innovative requirements are listed under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness which are quoted below:³⁴

Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments...

Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:

Undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGO's;

Participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and

Learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.

While the first of these two tasks indicates a willingness to reach outside the organization to bring in people who really know the stability business, the second task shows that DoD is absolutely serious about developing a robust and well-rounded capability within the military establishment. Assigning military members to work with NGO's is a revolutionary concept, and one which illustrates that DoD sees value in developing connections with the world outside of the U.S. military. This is a significant step forward in taking ownership of a mission that the military has long held at arms length. The final two tasks shown tie in well with ongoing initiatives to improve cultural awareness and increase language ability within the military.

Implementing the Directive

Does this Directive indicate a shift in U.S. policy regarding stability operations? Yes and no. In some ways it is merely admitting to what we have already been doing in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other places and seeks to prevent the lessons learned in those places from becoming lost like so many others. In other ways it is truly a new paradigm for the military. We are now seeking competency in a mission we have typically avoided and taking steps to institutionalize the capability through changes in training, doctrine, equipment procurement and even personnel assignments so that it becomes part of the military culture. Of course, implementing this new policy could not happen overnight even in the best of times. Institutional resistance, congressional oversight, or even public opinion can quickly develop roadblocks to successful implementation, but we have taken the first step. Clearly, U.S. policy regarding stability operations has undergone significant change under the last two administrations, but where do we go from here? How do we realize the enormous potential inherent in DoD Directive 3000.05? Below are several recommendations to improve U.S. policy and to effectively implement the Directive.

Improving U.S. Policy

1. *Issue a National Strategy for Supporting Peace* that adapts and builds upon PDD 25.

This strategy should also emphasize both the U.S. intent to conduct operations multi-laterally and the willingness to support the efforts of other countries. It should also emphasize how a peace support strategy ties in with the national security strategy of helping to shape a world where economic opportunity is available to anyone and terrorism is rejected by everyone. This will help provide a clear understanding of how the American government intends to operate and provide support to U.N. peace initiatives that may, in turn, impart legitimacy on peace operations undertaken by the U.S.

2. Resource the State Department with money and personnel to enable it to effectively fulfill the requirements of NSPD 44, "to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance."³⁵

3. Enable the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State Department Office to work with governments and agencies outside the U.S. who are active in performing stability operations. The Coordinator should actively seek to build the American reputation as a nation dedicated to supporting peace and stability throughout the world as a method of preventing war. This will help the U.S. build the trust and support of other countries that will be needed when difficult choices need to be made regarding these operations.

4. The Secretary of State should actively communicate both to the American people, and the rest of the world the value of stability operations as a method to prevent or reduce the scale of wars. This is absolutely vital in the effort to gain the support of the American public and world opinion for these complex operations.

Implementing DoD Directive 3000.05

1. Integrate DOD Directive 3000.05 into The National Defense Strategy, The National Military Strategy and Strategic Planning Guidance. Secretary Rumsfeld has taken a dramatic step towards giving the nation a new tool to implement the National Security Strategy, now it must be integrated across all applicable national security policies and realms or it will remain simply a DoD initiative.

2. Assign the Secretary of the Navy as the Executive Agent to implement the Directive with the Commandant of the Marine Corps as lead agent. This would provide the appropriate level of executive influence and capability to ensure the policy is effectively implemented. The Marines have a long and rich tradition of conducting stability operations overseas and have demonstrated expertise at this task. Their history of effectiveness at this type of operation

provides the type of professional focus we need to quickly become effective at stability operations.

3. Establish or expand DoD personnel stability operations assignments with other Departments (especially the Department of State), agencies, allies, NGO's, and the UN. These assignments will develop relationships with these organizations leading to more effective and efficient operations in the future. This will help the U.S. develop experience, capture lessons learned, and develop relationships with other countries, NGO's, and aid organizations that are involved in stability operations. Additionally, assign personnel to liaison positions with peacekeeping organizations in other countries, such as Canada, Finland, Norway, and Australia, which will serve to broaden the experience base. These assignments correspond to the cultural development imperative in DoD 3000.05 and must be integrated into the assignment management process so that this experience is spread throughout DoD.

4. Continue to expand the integration of stability operations into training exercises at all levels of the military. These exercises should include stability operations both simultaneous and subsequent to combat operations. This will help units and leaders at all levels gain experience with the unique requirements of stability operations.

5. The doctrinal development mandated by the Directive must be accompanied by organizational and assignment considerations beyond the cultural awareness actions noted above. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's) successfully employed in Afghanistan serve as a model for developing teams within military organizations that are prepared to quickly support the mission of stabilization. PRT-like cells could also be established in the Reserve Components in a fashion similar to Military History Detachments.

6. Continue developing stability operations skills, and regional area knowledge throughout the military training experience, including DA Civilian programs. While general principles may be taught early in the educational process, regional specialization will be required to produce the greatest effect. However, since it is impossible to accurately forecast future regional requirements, the specialized language skill requirements that are so essential to effective stability operations must come from a broad range of sources that must be cultivated in advance. Not all of these need be military, and not all military need be active duty.

7. Augment language training at each CONUS installation with native speakers. Rosetta Stone language training through AKO is adequate for vocabulary building but cannot replicate the idioms and speech nuances of a native speaker. Augment training in local languages at all OCONUS installations.

8. Integrate the Peacekeeping/Stability Operations Institute into the Joint

Forces Command to improve integration in the development of joint doctrine. Additionally, this organization should be closely integrated with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability within the Department of State to ensure unity of effort with that organization.

9. Develop a Stability Operations course to train the unique skills necessary to build expertise in stabilization operations. This course would integrate elements of various military organizations (such as Civil-Military Operations, Military Police, and PSYOPS) and NGO's (such as the International Red Cross / Red Crescent, and International Relief Teams) to provide a unique set of skills focused on planning and executing stability operations. Those with this training would be able to provide unique input to unit commanders on the conduct of stability operations.

10. Require that one staff officer and staff NCO position on each Battalion and Brigade level staff be trained in stability operations to serve as an advisor to the commander on stability operations. Division level staffs and above should include permanent staff sections that focus on stability operations and include positions for non-DoD members.

Stability operations have been part of U.S. national strategy for many years, even though we haven't always called them by that name or employed them effectively. We have intervened in many countries to restore civil government, hunt down international outlaws, and protect people from the repressive actions of their own governments. However, the U.S. has yet to develop and internalize stability operations policy which ties together national intentions in a comprehensive package that we can use to guide future actions and prepare those who must conduct those operations. The suggestions provided above would help move the U.S. in that direction, but no one should have any illusions that these steps are easy, or cheap. Time, money, effort, and especially leadership emphasis are required if the U.S. is to create comprehensive policy, build strong multilateral partnerships, and develop a robust and credible stability operations capability. However, it is time and money well spent. Peacekeeping is a bargain compared to the enormous cost in lives and national treasure that are spent with frightening speed when efforts to support peace are ignored and we are drawn into the crucible of war.

Endnotes

¹ Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, *Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 1996), 3.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2003), 1-2; Mr. Bill Flavin of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, interview by author, 21 December 2001, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

³ The specific standards outlined for supporting peacekeeping operations that were laid down in the released version are:

1. UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
2. There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: International aggression, or; - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
3. There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
4. For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
5. For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
6. The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.
7. The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
8. The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

⁴ Ibid, 7. The specific standards for committing U.S. troops that were laid down in the released version of the policy are:

1. Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
2. Personnel, funds and other resources are available.
3. U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success.
4. The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified.
5. Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.
6. Command and control arrangements are acceptable. Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:
 - a. There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
 - b. There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
 - c. There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.

⁵ Michael G. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend?* (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 106.

⁶ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2005) 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁸ United States Institute of Peace, *Global Peace Operations Initiative: Future Prospects* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, October 2004), available from http://www.usip.org/newsmedia/releases/2004/1021_nbgpoi.html; Internet; accessed 16 December 2005.

⁹ Rumsfeld, 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹² GEN Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2004), 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2005), 1.

¹⁵ Mr. Bill Flavin of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, interview by author, 21 December 2001, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

¹⁶ Defense Science Board, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, December 2004).

¹⁷ Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2005).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁹ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² US Department of State, *President Issues Directive to Improve the United States' Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, December 2005), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2005.

²³ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 3.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Fred Kaplan, *Do As I Say, Not As I DoD: Will the Pentagon ever value nation-building as much as war-fighting?* (Slate, Dec 2005).

²⁶ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 3.

²⁷ Ibid, 4.

²⁸ Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, 13.

²⁹ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 4.

³⁰ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 4.

³¹ Ibid, 5.

³² Ibid, 9.

³³ Ibid, 10.

³⁴ Ibid, 6.

³⁵ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2005), 2.